Cournot Models: Dynamics, Uncertainty and Learning

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Abstract

This chapter gives an overview of the recent developments in the theory of dynamic oligopolies including some new results. We will discuss the Cournot classical model and its extensions to product differentiation, multiproduct models, price adjusting oligopolies, labor managed and rent seeking games. The dynamic process based on these models will be analyzed. From the theoretical point of view we will investigate models with and without full information, with partial cooperation among the firms, and under the assumption that the information about the production levels of the rivals has time delay. We will also introduce and discuss special learning procedures based on repeated price information. We will also briefly discuss investigations based on laboratory experiments, in which more realistic cases can be examined.

Keywords

n-person game , oligopoly , dynamic systems , stability learning
  • Ferenc Szidarovszky Systems & Industrial Engineering Department, The University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, 85721-0020, USA.
  • Vernon L. Smith Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University, 3330 Washington Boulevard Arlington, VA 22201, USA.
  • Steven Rassenti Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University, 3330 Washington Boulevard Arlington, VA 22201, USA.
  • Pages: 55–84
  • Date Published: 2009-05-01
  • Vol. 11 No. 2 (2009): CUBO, A Mathematical Journal

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Published

2009-05-01

How to Cite

[1]
F. Szidarovszky, V. L. Smith, and S. Rassenti, “Cournot Models: Dynamics, Uncertainty and Learning”, CUBO, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 55–84, May 2009.